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Abstract— In social-ecological systems (SESs), social and
biophysical dynamics interact within and between structural
levels separated by spatial and temporal scales. Cross-scale
interactions (CSIs) are interdependences between processes at
different scales, generating behaviour unpredictable at single
scales. Understanding CSIs is important for improving SES
governance but they remain understudied. Theoretical models
are needed, which capture essential features while being simple
enough to yield insights into mechanisms. In a stylised model,
we study CSIs in a two-level system of weakly interacting
communities harvesting a common-pool resource. Community
members adaptively conform to, or defect from, a norm of socially
optimal harvesting, enforced through social sanctioning both
within and between communities. Each subsystem’s dynamics
depend sensitively on the other despite interactions being much
weaker between subsystems than within them. When interaction
is purely biophysical, stably high cooperation in one community
can cause cooperation in the other to collapse. However, even weak
social interaction can prevent collapse of cooperation and instead
cause collapse of defection. We identify conditions under which
subsystem-level cooperation produces desirable system-level
outcomes. Our findings expand evidence that collaboration is
important for sustainably managing shared resources, showing its
importance even when resource sharing and social relationships
are weak.
Index Terms— social-ecological system, cooperation, multiscale
analysis, cross-scale interactions, common-pool resource, resource
management
I. INTRODUCTION
In social-ecological systems (SESs), social and biophysical
dynamics interact within and between levels of organisation
separated by spatial and temporal scales. The Anthropocene
is characterised by global changes emerging from local
changes in human-environment interactions. Global changes
in turn cause local impacts and most attempts to manage
them also must be deployed locally [1]. The multiscale nature
of SES dynamics and governance makes theoretical character-
isation of cross-scale dynamics important, to help understand
how changes implemented at a given level will propagate
across scales [2]–[10].
According to hierarchy theory, when levels are separated
by scale, a complex system is ‘quasiseparable’ into semi-
independent levels; when modelling one level, variables at
other levels may be treated as constant boundary conditions
[10], [11]. In such systems, causes of nonlinear behaviour
at one level, such as threshold behaviour, must lie at the
same level. However, SESs are not separable in this way. If
a variable at some level approaches a critical threshold, even
a small perturbation from an interaction with a variable at
another level may drive it over the threshold, causing non-
linear behaviour such as a regime shift [10], [12], [13]. Such
1Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Kra¨ftriket 2B,
10691, Stockholm, Sweden
∗a.k.ringsmuth@gmail.com
2Fenner School of Environment & Society, The Australian National
University, Building 141, Linnaeus Way, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Aus-
tralia
sensitive dependence between processes at different scales,
which generates behaviour unpredictable from behaviour at
single scales, is known as a cross-scale interaction (CSI) [13].
Many researchers have qualitatively described CSIs in SESs,
conceptually [7], [10], [12], [14]–[18] and in specific case
studies (recently, [2], [19]–[22]). CSIs have been statistically
quantified in different systems, from data at multiple scales.
Brondizio et al [23] analysed Amazon deforestation data at
different length scales, showing that understanding defor-
estation trajectories requires differentiating causes at different
scales. Soranno and collaborators [4] quantified CSIs using
multiscale data and Bayesian hierarchical statistical models.
Applying this method to a study of lake water quality across
different regions of North America, they identified a scale
mismatch between quality variation and water management.
To date, however, there have been few attempts to theoreti-
cally model CSIs in SESs in terms of underlying mechanisms.
Peters et al [9] proposed a mathematical framework for
nonlinear dynamics in catastrophic events in terms of pattern-
process relationships, including feedbacks, across scales. They
applied this framework to characterise events such as the
spread of wildfires, infectious diseases and insect outbreaks,
finding that strategies for mitigating risks of such events must
account for CSIs and will often be counterintuitive. Recently,
Lansing and coworkers reported [24] an agent-based model of
water resource and pest control management in Bali’s ancient
rice terraces, to help explain shifts from individualistic field-
level practices to cooperative regional-level practices. Mod-
elling agent interactions and management decisions using
evolutionary game theory on a spatially embedded lattice
model showed that long-established spatial patterns observ-
able in the rice terraces can be created by feedback between
farmers’ decisions and the ecology of the paddies, triggering
a transition from individualistic to cooperative practices. In
the theoretical middle ground between generic frameworks
and detailed case models lies potential for stylised, minimal
models. These aim to capture essential system features while
being simple enough to yield insights into mechanisms. This
is helpful for guiding thought experiments relating CSIs to
underlying mechanisms, and for interpreting empirical case
study results.
Here, we develop a stylised model of resource management
by social pressure in a multilevel SES, accounting for CSIs.
Focusing on common-pool resource management, we extend
prior work by Tavoni, Schlu¨ter and Levin (TSL) [25], who
used evolutionary game theory to model a community of
agents harvesting a renewable common-pool resource as
a basis for economic production. Agents adaptively chose
whether to conform to, or defect from, a norm of socially opti-
mal harvesting, enforced through social sanctioning. Schlu¨ter
et al [26] extended the TSL model, using agent-based meth-
ods to test the robustness of norm-driven cooperation to
environmental variations. One was the introduction of a
neighbouring community and resource pool, with diffusive
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resource transfer between the pools. Results showed that
stably high cooperation in one community could cause co-
operation in the other to collapse because added resource
availability due to the pools’ coupling increased the payoff
for norm defectors. However, the communities did not adjust
their norms for added resource availability, and no social
interactions between communities were considered.
We extend this analysis of interacting SESs with two
types of social interaction and characterise how local-level
behaviours interact to produce outcomes at the system level.
First, we consider how communication between communi-
ties while setting harvesting norms can adjust the norms
for added resource availability due to biophysical coupling.
Second, we add ongoing social coupling such that norm-
cooperative agents can sanction defectors in both communi-
ties. We assume separation of scales between the strengths of
interactions within and between subsystems. This enables us
to quantify how nonlinear changes in subsystem behaviour
(appearance or disappearance of dynamical attractors) arise
from biophysical and social CSIs between the two subsys-
tems. We identify conditions under which subsystem-level
cooperation gives rise to desirable system-level outcomes,
and conditions which prevent this.
The exact system model is analytically insoluble and we
use perturbation theory [27] to derive an approximate model
in the weak coupling (multiscale) regime. This model closely
approximates numerical solutions of the exact model. Solving
our model with a combination of analytical and numerical
methods allows more efficient characterisation of the param-
eter space than purely numerical methods, and the derived
equations shed light on mechanisms. This dual approach is
also a basis for future development using more advanced
multiscale analytical methods from dynamical systems theory
and statistical physics, which have elucidated a wide range
of complex systems [28]–[32]. We envisage that, in future, a
combination of mathematical and agent-based stylised multi-
scale models may enable an effective theory of CSIs in SESs,
complementing statistical and qualitative analyses from mul-
tiscale empirical studies. This may help to guide empirical
researchers in quantifying CSIs and mechanisms underlying
them, revealing new leverage points for governance of real
systems.
II. MODEL
We consider the two-level model schematised in figure
1, comprising two interacting social-ecological subsystems,
each of which, in isolation, is described by the TSL model
[25]. In each, a community of agents harvests a common-
pool resource. Each agent adaptively conforms to, or defects
from, a social norm of socially optimal harvesting, choosing
a strategy based on resource availability and the utilities of
strategies chosen by other agents. The biophysical variables
of interest are the resource stocks, and social variables the
norm-cooperative fractions of the subsystem populations.
The two are directly coupled only within each subsystem
(agents harvest only locally), but the biophysical and social
variables are coupled between subsystems. Social interaction
between subsystems comprises two steps: first, communities
may choose to share information about their resources while
establishing harvesting norms; second, cooperators ostracise
defectors to enforce the norms.
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Fig. 1. Model system with social and biophysical interactions
between symmetrical subsystems. In each, a community of agents
extracts a renewable common pool resource and each adaptively
chooses between cooperative (low) and defective (high) extraction
effort levels, constrained by a social norm of non-excessive harvesting
(quantified by E∗c
(i)). Cooperators enforce the norm by ostracising
defectors. Biophysical coupling (strength δ) permits resource transfer
between subsystems. Communities may choose to share resource
information while setting norms; we assume that this communication
is either perfect or nonexistent. Ongoing social coupling (strength λ)
enables cooperators to ostracise defectors in both communities.
A. Biophysical dynamics
We model subsystem resource dynamics as the sum of
local processes and subsystem interactions. Following TSL
[25], [26], the resource stock of, for example, subsystem 1
(R(1)(t)) is replenished by its environment at constant rate
(c(1)) and lost at a rate that depends on the square of the
resource occupation (ratio of the stock to its maximum value,
R(1)m , determined by limits such as the capacity of a reservoir).
Resource is also harvested by the subsystem community of
n(1) agents, collectively exerting effort E(1)(t). Resource is
transferred diffusively between subsystems such that the rate
depends linearly on the difference between their resource
occupations. Under the combined action of these processes,
subsystem 1’s resource stock changes according to the first-
order, nonlinear ordinary differential equation,
R˙(1)(t) = c(1) − d(1)
(
R(1)(t)
R(1)m
)2
− qE(1)(t)R(1)(t)
+ r
(
R(2)(t)
R(2)m
− R
(1)(t)
R(1)m
)
. (1)
Here, d(1) is a coefficient particular to a given system and
q (the ‘technology factor’) is a constant. In real systems,
resource transfer coupling, r may depend on flow direction
due to, for example, constraints of geography or institutional
regulations. However, for simplicity we assume that r is
independent of flow direction and that both subsystems have
equal resource capacities, and replenishment and dissipation
coefficients (R(i)m ≡ Rm, c(i) ≡ c, d(i) ≡ d). So that the
effects of biophysical and social subsystem interactions may
be compared fairly, we define dimensionless variables, ρ(i) =
R(i)/Rm and τ = (d/Rm)t, and rewrite (1) as
ρ˙(1)(τ) =
c
d
− ρ(1)(τ)2 − qRm
d
E(1)(τ)ρ(1)(τ)
+
r
d
(ρ(2)(τ)− ρ(1)(τ)). (2)
2
In a given system, it may be possible to quantify how
coupling strength depends on space and time. For example,
if communities harvest water from connected bodies, the
mechanics of water transfer between them will depend on
geographical parameters such as distance. However, for gen-
erality, we impose separation of scales between subsystem-
and system-level interaction strengths phenomenologically,
by invoking a weak coupling parameter, δ ≡ rd , 0 ≤ δ  1.
This allows us to treat system-level resource transfer as a
small perturbation to subsystem-level dynamics and, there-
fore, using regular perturbation theory [27], to assume that
(2) has solutions of the form
ρ(1)(τ) = ρ(1)0 (τ) + δρ
(1)
1 (τ) + δ
2ρ
(1)
2 (τ) + .... (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) and truncating at first order in
δ yields differential equations for the isolated subsystem
resource dynamics and a perturbation due to system-level
resource transfer, respectively:
ρ˙0
(1)(τ) =
c
d
− ρ(1)0 (τ)2 −
qRm
d
E(1)(τ)ρ(1)0 (τ), (4a)
ρ˙1
(1)(τ) = ρ(2)0 (τ)− ρ(1)0 (τ)(1 + 2ρ(1)1 (τ))
− qRm
d
E(1)(τ)ρ(1)1 (τ). (4b)
In the supporting information (SI), we show that this descrip-
tion very closely approximates the complete description (2)
(see fig. S2). Perturbation theory makes the system mathe-
matically tractable and also links it to core concepts of social-
ecological resilience [5], which may be defined as the capacity
of a SES to absorb perturbations while maintaining structure
and function [3], [5]. Our analysis directly assesses subsystem
resilience to cross-scale perturbations.
B. Social dynamics
Total community extractive effort is the sum of all cooper-
ators’ and defectors’ efforts. For subsystem 1,
E(1)(τ) = n(1)ec(1)
(
µ(1) + (1− µ(1))φ(1)(τ)
)
. (5)
Here, 0 ≤ φ(1)(τ) ≤ 1 is the population fraction made up
of norm cooperators, who each extract at socially optimal
(lower) effort level, ec(1), while the remaining defectors exert
(higher) ed(1). We define µ(1) = ed(1)/ec(1). Community pro-
ductivity is assumed to take Cobb-Douglas form in effort and
resource [25]:
f (1)(τ) = γ[E(1)(t)]α[R(1)(t)]β
= γRβm[E(1)(τ)]α[ρ(1)(τ)]β , (6)
where γ is the total factor productivity and α, β are constants.
Payoffs for cooperators (c) and defectors (d) are [25]
pix
(1)(τ) = ex(1)
(
f (1)(τ)
E(1)(τ)
− w
)
, x = c, d, (7)
where w is the cost of production. Each defector experiences
social sanctioning (‘ostracism’) from the cooperative fractions
of both communities, weighted by subsystem populations
and social couplings, λ(ij):
ω(1)(τ) = s
(
n(1)eTe
gφ(1)(τ)
+ λ(21)n(2)eTe
gφ(2)(τ)
)
, (8)
where s is the maximal sanctioning that an individual can
apply. We assume symmetrical community populations and
social couplings (n(i) ≡ n; λ(ij) ≡ λ), but note that in
real systems they may differ for many reasons. Mechanisms
underlying social coupling are particular to a given system.
For generality, we again impose separation of scales by
assuming that couplings are much weaker between individ-
uals in separate communities than in the same community
(0 ≤ λ  1). Figure 2 plots the ostracism experienced
by a defector in subsystem 1 due to cooperators in both
subsystems. The dependences on φ(1) and φ(2) are both non-
linear, with threshold behaviour at φ(i) ∼ 0.35. The curve,
ω(1) = ω(1)(φ(1)) at φ(2) = 0 is identical to that shown in figure
2 of [25]. Although the nonlinear factors of both terms in (8)
are identically parameterised, ω(1) depends more weakly on
φ(2) than φ(1) because the second term is scaled by the weak
social coupling. The ostracism components from the two
communities add, producing effects not seen when ostracism
is only local. Defectors in community i experience nonzero
ostracism even when φ(i) is below its threshold, provided φ(j)
(j 6= i) is above its threshold (φ(i) . 0.35 . φ(j)). Moreover,
when cooperators dominate both communities (φ(i) & 0.5),
defectors in each experience a higher level of ostracism than
can be applied by their local communities alone.
(2)φ
(1)ω
(τ)
(τ)
(1)φ (τ)
Fig. 2. Ostracism experienced by defectors in subsystem 1 due
to the cooperative fractions of the subsystem 1 and 2 populations.
Parameters: n = 50, λ = 0.2, s = 0.34/n = 6.8 × 10−3, T = −150,
g = −10. The s value is derived from the value assumed in [25]
for the maximum sanctioning applicable by the whole community,
h = 0.34.
The cooperative fraction of each subsystem’s population
evolves according to mean-field replicator dynamics [33].
For subsystem 1, this is written as in [25] but using our
dimensionless variables:
φ˙(1)(τ) =
Rm
d
φ(1)(τ)(1− φ(1)(τ))
×
(
pid
(1)(τ)− pic(1)(τ)
pid
(1)(τ)
)
(ω(1)(τ)− pid(1)(τ)).(9)
C. Cases for modelling coupled system
When δ = λ = 0, the original TSL model [25] describes
each subsystem. In section S-A, we summarise its features as
a benchmark for subsystem behaviour. In the sections below,
we investigate how biophysical and social perturbations due
to subsystem couplings shift subsystem fixed points, relative
to an isolated subsystem, in different cases. First, we quantify
how biophysical coupling affects each subsystem’s norm of
socially optimal harvesting when communities share resource
information during norm setting. Two scenarios are obtained,
in which norms respectively are and are not adjusted for
coupling. We compute subsystem 1’s biophysical and social
3
fixed points for both scenarios, in cases where coupling is
purely biophysical, purely social, or a combination of the
two. We fix coupling strengths such that interactions between
subsystems are at least twice as weak as interactions within
them (0 ≤ δ ≤ 0.5, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 0.5) and also fix the cooperator-
defector effort multiplier for subsystem 2, µ(2) arbitrarily
at 75% of the range of µ values in an isolated subsystem
(µ(2) = 0.75(µN − 1) + 1 = 2.88). This is because the range
of µ depends on the biophysical coupling strength, so varies
across the parameter space (see section III-A). For consistency,
therefore, µ(2) is fixed relative to the isolated case.
Prior analysis [26] simulated the full coupled subsystem
dynamics for each parameter combination. Initial conditions
were chosen (φ(2)(0) always 0.9, φ(1)(0) varied) and the system
numerically evolved to equilibrium. Here, since we assume
equilibrium and analyse the stability landscape, we instead
fix the long-time behaviour of subsystem 2 and ignore its
transient behaviour, which may originate anywhere in the
chosen equilibrium’s basin of attraction. For each scenario of
norms and couplings, we consider cases in which subsystem
2 equilibrates at each of its monomorphic fixed points (φ(2)
∗
=
0, 1). Although the stabilities of these fixed points vary across
the parameter space, they are always accessible through an
appropriate choice of initial conditions. This is not true for
the mixed fixed points, which vary in both coordinates and
stability.
For each case, we address two questions: 1) is subsystem 1
resilient to cross-scale perturbations from subsystem 2 or do
they cause it to undergo a stability phase transition; 2) does
the long-time behaviour of subsystem 2 promote or prevent
similar long-time behaviour in subsystem 1 and, therefore,
the overall system (both subsystems together)?
III. RESULTS
A. Norm scenarios in coupled system
In each subsystem, the effort level satisfying (S2a) when
the resource is at equilibrium quantifies the socially optimal
harvesting norm. To compute subsystem 1’s resource equi-
libria, we assume that both subsystems’ zeroth- and first-
order resource dynamics have equilibrated. Setting ρ˙1(1)(τ) =
ρ˙1
(2)(τ) = 0 yields
ρ
(1)
1
∗
=
d(ρ(2)0
∗ − ρ(1)0
∗
)
RmE(1)
∗ + 2dρ(1)0
∗ (10a)
=
Rm(E(1)
∗ − E(2)∗)− S(E(1)∗) + S(E(2)∗)
2S(E(1)∗)
. (10b)
When multiplied by δ, this gives the shift in subsystem
1’s resource equilibrium due to transfer between subsystems
(relative to ρ(1)0
∗
). Substituting (10b) and (S1) into (3) gives
ρ(1)
∗ ≈ ρ(1)0
∗
+ δρ(1)1
∗
≈ 1
2S(E(1)∗)d
(
4cd + RmE(1)
∗
(RmE(1)
∗ − S(E(1)∗))
+ δd(Rm(E(1)
∗ − E(2)∗)− S(E(1)∗) + S(E(2)∗))
)
. (11)
Empirical studies have shown that communication leading
to norm-based collaboration between common pool resource
harvesters can strongly improve resource sustainability com-
pared with cases of no communication [6]. We consider
two scenarios for norm setting, called ‘uncollaborative’ and
‘collaborative’. In the former, communities set norms without
communicating, as if the subsystems were isolated (E∗c ≡
Ec∗0 = 0.483 and E∗N ≡ EN∗0 = 1.83; µN = EN∗0/Ec∗0 ≡
µN0 = 3.78, as calculated in section S-A). In the collaborative
scenario, communities perfectly communicate and set norms
using resource information from both subsystems. Substitut-
ing (11) into (6), and the result into (S2a) and (S2b), gives
shifted E∗c and E∗N values. Numerically solving for these
values across the weak coupling range (0 ≤ δ ≤ 0.5) yields
distributions that are very well approximated by linear fits
from least-squares regression (Pearson correlation, r > 0.999
for both):
E∗c (δ) = Ec∗0 + 7.70× 10−2δ
µN(δ) = µN0 − 5.56× 10−1δ. (12)
In the collaborative scenario, these shifts must be included in
both ρ(i)0 and ρ
(i)
1 to calculate ρ
(i).
B. Purely biophysical coupling
We first study cases in which 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, λ = 0.
Evaluating (10b) determines shifts in biophysical equilibria
across the parameter space (see fig. S3). As (10a) makes clear,
ρ
(1)
1
∗
varies in proportion to the difference in zeroth-order
resource equilibria; when ρ(1)0
∗
is higher than ρ(2)0
∗
, the first-
order dynamics transfer resource from subsystem 1 to 2, and
conversely. In turn, this difference depends on the social fixed
point at which subsystem 2 is assumed to equilibrate. When
φ(2)
∗
= 0 (fig. S3a,b), subsystem 2 is purely defective, the
corresponding high level of extractive effort results in lower
ρ
(2)
0
∗
, and the equilibrium first-order dynamics persistently
transfer resource from subsystem 1 to 2. Conversely, when
φ(2)
∗
= 1 (fig. S3c, d), the correspondingly low extractive effort
gives higher ρ(2)0
∗
and the first-order equilibrium persistently
transfers resource from subsystem 2 to 1.
Solving (9) when φ˙(1) = 0 yields monomorphic social
fixed points at φ(1)
∗
= 0, 1, and shifted mixed social
fixed points on loci generally defined by ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
) =
pi
(1)
d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
). More explicitly,
(13)
hn
(
eTe
gφ(1)
∗
+ λeTe
gφ(2)
∗)
= ecµ(1)
(
γ
[
E(1)
∗]α−1 [ Rm
2Q(E(1)∗)
×
(
δ
(
2(E(1)
∗ − E(2)∗)− Q(E(1)∗) + Q(E(2)∗)
)
+ 2Q(E(1)
∗
)
(
Q(E(1)
∗
)− 2E(1)∗
))]β
− w
)
,
where Q(E(i)
∗
) =
√
1 + 4E(i)∗2. Figure S4 plots
ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
) and pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
), with curve
intersections corresponding to mixed social fixed points
because φ˙(1)(τ) = 0 when ω(1)(τ) = pid(1)(τ) in (9); the
ostracism and defector payoff balance.
Figure 3a shows shifted biophysical and social fixed points
in subsystem 1 under purely biophysical subsystem coupling.
Results are shown for the upper bound of the weak coupling
range (δ = 0.5, which we call moderate coupling), for both
norm scenarios, when subsystem 2 has equilibrated at its
purely cooperative social equilibrium (φ(2)
∗
= 1). When
4
φ(2)
∗
= 0 instead, subsystem 1 shows qualitatively similar
behaviour to an isolated subsystem and is therefore resilient
to the cross-scale biophysical perturbation (see fig. S7). How-
ever, figure 3ai shows a stability phase transition; when
µ(1) & 2.9, there are no mixed social fixed points because
defector payoff exceeds ostracism for all values of φ(1) (see fig.
S4b). Intuitively, this is because biophysical coupling gives
subsystem 1 agents access to extra resource from subsystem
2, increasing their defector payoff, while without social cou-
pling, subsystem 2 cannot provide extra ostracism to balance
this payoff. Only the purely defective fixed point is stable in
this region, so for any φ(1)(0) < 1, collapse of cooperation is
inevitable. This constitutes a CSI, since the weak perturbation
from system-level dynamics generates a phase transition in
subsystem 1, from multistable to monostable behaviour, and
this cannot be predicted by analysing either subsystem in
isolation. This is consistent with [26], in which this shift was
described using agent-based methods1. Notably, cooperation
never collapses in the collaborative norm scenario; operating
under a norm set with the benefit of communication between
subsystems preserves cooperation where it otherwise fails.
Moreover, under both subsystem 2 equilibria (φ(2)
∗
= 0, 1),
the C¯ equilibrium in subsystem 1 is more cooperative, for a
given µ(1) value, in the collaborative scenario.
C. Purely social coupling
We now consider cases in which 0 < λ ≤ 0.5 and
δ = 0. Although one may question why communities that do
not share resources would sanction each other for violating
resource use norms, it is instructive to study such cases before
combining social and biophysical coupling. When δ = 0,
(3) reduces to ρ(1)(τ) = ρ(1)0 (τ), so the resource equilibrates
as in an isolated subsystem and the uncollaborative and
collaborative scenarios are identical. Moreover, the mixed
social fixed points are independent of µ(2) when δ = 0 in
(13). Figure S5 shows the intersections of ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
)
and pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
) (the mixed social fixed points) for
purely social coupling.
Figure 3b shows how moderate purely social coupling
(λ = 0.5, δ = 0) shifts system 1’s fixed points for each of
subsystem 2’s monomorphic social equilibria. When φ(2)
∗
=
0, subsystem 1’s behaviour is qualitatively similar to an
isolated subsystem and is therefore resilient to the cross-scale
social perturbation. However, when φ(2)
∗
= 1, subsystem 1
undergoes a stability phase transition. There is a mixed social
equilibrium with a strong defector majority for µ(1) . 2.6.
For µ(1) & 2.9, there is a single mixed social equilibrium
with a strong cooperator majority. In the intervening region
(2.6 . µ(1) . 2.9), ostracism exceeds defector payoff for
all values of φ(1) and only the purely cooperative fixed
point is stable. Intuitively, this is because social coupling
exposes subsystem 1 defectors to additional ostracism from
subsystem 2 cooperators, while the absence of biophysical
coupling prevents subsystem 2 from increasing the subsystem
1 defector payoff through added resource availability. In this
region, collapse of defection is inevitable in subsystem 1 for
any φ(1)(0) > 0. We see that the weak perturbation provided
by social coupling between subsystems can produce two
1Due to small differences in model formulation, δ in [26] (intro-
duced in equation (4.1)) is equal to one quarter of δ here. e.g. δ = 0.5
here is equivalent to δ = 0.125 in [26].
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Fig. 3. a. Shifted biophysical (blue, purple) and social (or-
ange) fixed points in subsystem 1 under purely biophysical,
moderate (δ = 0.5) subsystem coupling. Results shown for the
purely cooperative social equilibrium in subsystem 2 (φ(2)
∗
= 1), in
the uncollaborative (panel i) and collaborative (ii) norm scenarios.
Dashed and solid orange loci respectively comprise unstable and
stable social fixed points. Defector payoff overwhelms ostracism in
the red region in panel i. b. Shifted subsystem 1 fixed points under
purely social, moderate (λ = 0.5) subsystem coupling. Results
shown for the purely defective (panel i) and purely cooperative
(ii) social equilibrium in subsystem 2 (φ(2)
∗
= 0, 1 respectively).
Ostracism overwhelms defector payoff in the green region in panel ii.
The previously unseen social attractor is labelled: D¯ - mixed, defector
dominated.
kinds of stability phase transitions at the subsystem level,
from a multistable to a monostable phase and between two
different multistable phases.
D. Combined biophysical and social coupling
Finally, we study interplay between weak biophysical and
social couplings ( 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, 0 < λ ≤ 0.5). This
represents a scenario in which two communities with a weak
social relationship weakly share a common pool resource
and enforce social norms within and between communi-
ties. Figure S6 shows the intersections of ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
)
and pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
) (the mixed social fixed points)
for equally moderate biophysical and social couplings (δ =
λ = 0.5). Figure 4a plots variations in subsystem 1’s fixed
points for subsystem 2’s purely cooperative social equilib-
rium (φ(2)
∗
= 1). The collapse of subsystem 1 cooperation
seen with purely biophysical coupling in the uncollaborative
scenario (fig. 3ai) is prevented. Moreover, within small pa-
rameter ranges (2.9 . µ(1) . 3 in panel i and 2.5 . µ(1) . 3
in ii), defection collapses instead. This shows that when
biophysical and social coupling are equally moderate, and
subsystem 2 equilibrates in a fully cooperative state, added
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ostracism experienced by subsystem 1 defectors overwhelms
extra payoff available due to added resource access. The net
result is a stability phase transition for subsystem 1, which
does not occur without social coupling. Importantly, the
long-time results of social interactions between subsystems
overwhelm the effects of their biophysical interactions even
when social and biophysical couplings are equal in strength.
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Fig. 4. a. Shifted biophysical (blue, purple) and social (orange)
fixed points in subsystem 1 under combined biophysical and social
subsystem coupling. Results shown for equally moderate couplings
(δ = λ = 0.5), for the purely cooperative social equilibrium in subsys-
tem 2 (φ(2)
∗
= 1). Ostracism overwhelms defector payoff in the green
regions. b. Phase plots showing how subsystem 1 social stability
phase depends on social and biophysical coupling strengths, when
µ(1) = 2.9, µ(2) = 2.88, φ(2)
∗
= 1. Results shown for 500 values,
each, of δ and λ (2.5 × 105 combinations) per plot. Five stability
phases are labelled, each comprising a landscape with either one or
two of the four social attractor types described. The phase structure
varies significantly across the (µ(1) , µ(2) , φ(2)
∗
) parameter space;
values chosen here provide an illustrative example. i. Uncollaborative
scenario, containing five phases. The D phase appears only in a small
region at the lower right of panel (δ & 0.47) and is magnified in the
inset. ii. Collaborative scenario, containing four phases.
The results reveal important differences between norm
scenarios. Subsystem cooperativities are much more mutually
sensitive in the uncollaborative scenario. Weak perturbations
from subsystem 2 can cause opposing types of social stability
phase transitions in subsystem 1; collapse of cooperation
when coupling is purely biophysical and collapse of defection
when social coupling is present. Conversely, in the collabora-
tive scenario, subsystems do not risk collapse of cooperation
due to perturbations from weak biophysical coupling. Social
coupling can cause collapse of defection also in this case,
however. Furthermore, subsystem 1’s C¯ equilibrium is more
cooperative in the collaborative scenario, as previously seen
for purely biophysical coupling.
Figure 4b shows how subsystem 1’s social stability land-
scape depends on social and biophysical coupling strengths
across the weak-coupling parameter subspace. Five stability
phases are labelled, each with a different combination of so-
cial attractors. There is clear asymmetry between how social
coupling and biophysical coupling determine the stability
phase. Whereas changes in social coupling strength cause
phase transitions for every value of biophysical coupling
in both scenarios, the inverse is not true; for most social
coupling values, no change in biophysical coupling causes
a phase transition. Panel i shows a phase plot for the un-
collaborative scenario. The collapse of cooperation seen in
figure 3a is restricted to a small parameter region at the
lower right corner. At the opposite extreme, where social
coupling is moderate, lies the purely cooperative phase and
this extends across the range of weak biophysical couplings.
The spectrum of other stability phases lie between these
extremes. In section S-D, we briefly describe mechanisms
underlying the behaviour of each phase. The overall trend
is that increasing the social coupling causes successive phase
transitions in the subsystem 1 stability landscape, gradually
increasing its cooperativity. The collaborative scenario (fig.
4bii) shows the same broad features except that the D phase
is absent, for reasons explained in section III-C. Additionally,
whereas the phase boundaries increase monotonically with
biophysical coupling in the uncollaborative scenario, they de-
crease monotonically in the collaborative scenario. Thus, for a
given level of resource sharing, communication during norm
setting will allow lower levels of social coupling to cause
stability phase transitions in subsystem 1. Collaborative norm
setting is therefore an investment which can later increase the
power of social pressure as a resource-sustaining mechanism.
In sum, the results show the importance of collaboration
between communities, both in establishing norms and en-
forcing those norms through social sanctioning, even when
biophysical and social coupling are much weaker between
subsystems than within each.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our results show that social and biophysical CSIs can
profoundly affect how interacting communities manage a
common pool resource, and how their subsystem-level be-
haviours interact to produce system-level outcomes. Even
weak social interactions between communities can produce
long-time behaviour significantly more cooperative than that
which eventuates in their absence. This is important for gov-
ernance because it reveals a mechanism by which resource
managers can help to ensure that subsystem-level efforts
produce desired system-level outcomes. When coupling is
purely biophysical and at least moderate in strength (δ & 0.5),
and norms are established without communication, pursuing
socially optimal resource use is effectively a zero-sum game
between communities. In this perverse situation, desire for
system-level sustainability expressed through efforts at the
subsystem level is self-defeating; success for the subsystem
guarantees failure for the system. However, enforcing norms
between communities resolves this because increased coop-
eration in one community encourages cooperation in the
other, allowing them to cooperate as whole communities.
This system-level cooperation depends strongly on the social
coupling strength, even within the weak range. Strengthening
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the coupling produces successively higher levels of cooper-
ation through transitions between stability phases (fig. 4b).
Moreover, communities that share information during norm
setting protect themselves against collapse of cooperation at
the subsystem level, and increase the power of intercom-
munity social pressure to increase cooperation at the system
level.
Methodologically, our dual analytical/numerical approach
offers a powerful complement to purely numerical, agent-
based methods [26]. In the dual approach, finding analytical
expressions for subsystem fixed points enables their direct
evaluation, circumventing the need for full dynamical sim-
ulation and drastically accelerating characterisation of the
stability landscape across the parameter space. However,
this comes at the cost of statistical behaviour outside the
mean field, which is preserved by agent-based methods.
There is also a small accuracy cost incurred by the per-
turbative biophysical model (see section S-B), though this
can in principle be reduced by truncating (3) at a higher
order, notwithstanding associated increases in mathematical
difficulty. In addition to efficiently characterising a two-level
system, our dual approach is well suited to future study of
larger systems, including more subsystem interaction mech-
anisms and/or more hierarchical levels. Powerful methods
have been developed within the theory of dynamical systems
and statistical physics, for analysing interplay between struc-
ture and dynamics at different scales in many-body systems.
Singular perturbation theory [30] and renormalisation [29],
for example, were first developed as refinements to the
regular perturbation theory on which our biophysical model
(4a, 4b) is based. Renormalisation theory was refined into
a technique for coarse-graining the statistical description of
systems with many length and time scales, concisely ex-
plaining relationships between behaviour at different scales.
This has provided deep insight into critical transitions in
a variety of systems. Although it is acknowledged that
dynamical systems methods are useful for modelling SESs,
and that there is a need to better understand the multiscale
behaviour of SESs and how this relates to their critical
transitions, such multiscale methods have yet to be applied in
this field. The formalism developed here is naturally suited
to extension through such methods, which we suggest for
future research. We foresee complementary roles for dual
analytical/numerical dynamical systems methods and agent-
based simulation, with the latter providing a computational
laboratory in which to test the former in small prototypic
systems before application to systems impractically large for
full simulation.
Even before extending the model to larger systems, there
are many options for refinement. One is to modify the
social interaction model by applying results from psychol-
ogy. Research on in-group bias suggests that members of
a community (in-group) are likely to sanction members of
another community (out-group) more harshly than in-group
members for norm violation [35]. This could be incorporated
into our model as dependence of the parameters controlling
the curvature and maximum of the ostracism experienced
by out-group defectors (h, T and g in the second term of
(8)) on the social coupling between communities (λ). Fur-
thermore, psychological limits to human social network size
and structure [36] could be incorporated by limiting the
social connectedness available to each agent and, therefore,
their capacity to ostracise and be ostracised by others. Other
interesting results may come from breaking the parametric
symmetries assumed to exist between subsystems in this
study. Ultimately, more realistic representations of SESs will
come from using a refined subsystem model as a building
block in larger, multilevel, multiscale systems with param-
eterisations statistically distributed across subsystems. The
multiscale analysis methods described above are well suited
to such a system. Used in combination with statistical and
qualitative analyses from multiscale empirical studies, such
modelling methods offer strong potential for better under-
standing and managing CSIs in SESs.
Our work raises fundamental questions about what is
meant by ’scale’ in SESs, and how best to model it. Different
usage of the term across natural and social sciences influ-
encing SES research has produced tension in the literature
[7], [10], which must be navigated if a coherent theory of
CSIs is to be developed. Natural sciences usually define scales
as orders of magnitude in spatial and temporal separations.
Social sciences typically define scales as levels of organisation
in hierarchical social systems, though there has also been
interest in how spatial embeddedness affects social systems
[37]–[39]. In modelling studies, CSIs are commonly posed
as interactions between quantities which vary over different
spatial and temporal scales but precisely how such inter-
actions depend on space and time is often not considered.
In this study, we considered interactions across scales in
the strengths of biophysical and social couplings within and
between subsystems. One possibility for interpreting our
results in terms of conventional spatiotemporal framing of
CSIs is to determine how biophysical and social couplings
depend on space and time. However, given the vast range
of resource pool types and social systems which may be
studied, this is a nontrivial undertaking. Intuitively, one
may expect coupling strengths to vary inversely with spa-
tiotemporal separation and this may indeed be the case in
some systems. However, in a globalised, digitally connected
world, couplings can depend counterintuitively on, or be
effectively independent from, spatiotemporal separations, as
is the case for so-called teleconnections [17]. Recent work
on social-ecological network analysis [40]–[42] has begun to
quantify how the spatiotemporal embeddedness of social and
biophysical dynamics affects SES resilience. We propose that
further research in this direction, across a broad range of
systems and contexts, may be an important step towards a
more general and broadly applicable theory of CSIs.
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S. SUPPORTING INFORMATION
A. Isolated subsystem: original TSL model
When δ = λ = 0, the original TSL model [25] describes
each subsystem. Dropping labels for brevity, we summarise
its features as a benchmark for assessing effects of perturba-
tions due to biophysical and social couplings in the coupled
system. TSL calculated biophysical and social fixed points
for a range of initial social conditions, φ(0) and parameters,
µ. Setting ρ˙(τ) = 0, (4a) gives biophysical fixed points as a
function of total community effort:
ρ∗0 =
q
2d
(−E∗Rm + S(E∗)) , (S1)
where S(E∗) =
√
4cd + E∗2R2m and asterisks denote fixed-
point values. Substitution into (6) gives socially optimal
(cooperative) and individually optimal (Nash) effort levels
(E∗c , E∗N), conditions for which are [34] respectively
w =
d f
dE∗ and (S2a)
w =
f
E∗ −
1
n
(
f
E∗ −
d f
dE∗
)
. (S2b)
It is assumed that 1 < µ ≤ µN , where µN = E∗N/E∗c . Using
parameters from [25] (n = 50, q = 1, c = 50, d = 50, Rm =
200, α = 0.6, β = 0.2, γ = 10) gives E∗c = 0.483, E∗N = 1.83 and
corresponding resource fixed points ρ∗0c = 0.425, ρ
∗
0N = 0.134.
Socially optimal and Nash efforts for individual agents are
ec = E∗c /n = 9.65× 10−3 and eN = E∗N/n = 3.65× 10−2. The
former quantifies the norm of socially optimal harvesting. It
is assumed that ec < ed ≤ eN , so 1 < µ ≤ 3.78, since eN/ec ≡
µN = 3.78. Setting φ˙(τ) = 0 in (9) yields monomorphic social
fixed points (φ∗ = 0, 1) and mixed social fixed points on loci
described by ω(φ∗) = pid(ec , µ, φ∗ , ρ∗0).
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Fig. S1. Social (φ∗ – orange) and biophysical (ρ∗ – blue) fixed points
of an isolated TSL subsystem, parameterised by cooperative popu-
lation fraction (φ(τ)) and defector-cooperator effort multiplier (µ).
Dashed and solid orange loci respectively comprise unstable social
fixed points and stable social fixed points (equilibria). The equilibria
are labelled by type: D- purely defective, C- purely cooperative,
C¯- mixed, cooperator dominated. Parameters: s = 6.8 × 10−3 , T =
−150, g = −10. See figure 3 in [25] for more information.
Figure S1 overlays these on corresponding biophysical
fixed points (S1). The stable fixed points (equilibria) are
attractors toward which the system evolves. The µ parameter
space is divided into two social stability phases (qualitatively
different stability landscapes, each persisting across some
parameter range2), characterised by different combinations
of attractors. When µ & 2.0, there are two social attractors,
one purely defective (φ∗ = 0) and one mixed and cooperator-
dominated (0.5 < φ∗ < 1). We label these attractor types,
respectively, D and C¯. When µ . 2.0, D and a purely
cooperative attractor (C; φ∗ = 1) are present.
B. Assessment of perturbative approximation
We approximate the biophysical dynamics in the coupled
subsystem model (2) with a perturbation expansion (3), trun-
cated at first order. Here we assess this approximation by
comparing it with the full numerical solution of the mean-
field replicator dynamics (2). Figure S2 compares both the
transient dynamics and equilibria for a range of coupling
strengths. In each case, calculations were run until the system
converged sufficiently close to equilibrium that the following
condition was met:
|ρ˙(1)(τ)|+|ρ˙(2)(τ)|+|φ˙(1)(τ)|+|φ˙(2)(τ)|< Γ, (S3)
where Γ is a tolerance which we set to Γ = 10−5, since this
gave a good balance between accuracy and practicality.
We label the lowest time at which (S3) is satisfied τeq, and
define the relative error in the resource equilibrium obtained
from the perturbative approximation,
∆ρ(1)
∗
=
ρ
(1)
0 (τeq) + δρ
(1)
1 (τeq)− ρ(1)(τeq)
ρ(1)(τeq)
, (S4)
where ρ(1)(τeq) is the numerical solution of the full resource
dynamics (2). Similarly, we define the relative error in the
equilibrium cooperative fraction of the subsystem 1 popula-
tion,
∆φ(1)
∗
=
φ
(1)
p (τeq)− φ(1)(τeq)
φ(1)(τeq)
, (S5)
where φ(1)p (τeq) is the cooperative fraction obtained when
the perturbative approximation is used for the resource dy-
namics and φ(1)(τeq) is the full numerical solution. These
relative errors are assessed for each case in figure S2. The
results show excellent agreement between the perturbative
and full solutions in the cases of very weak (∆ρ(1)
∗
= 1.2×
10−4, ∆φ(1)∗ = −7.9 × 10−4) and weak coupling (∆ρ(1)∗ =
4.9× 10−3, ∆φ(1)∗ = −1.1× 10−2). Surprisingly, even though
the strong coupling case (panel c) violates the weak cou-
pling assumption underpinning our perturbative treatment
(0 < δ  1), the relative errors in equilibrium resource
and cooperative population levels are both only ∼ 2% in
this case. Although this varies across the parameter space,
we found comparably small errors across a wide range of
parameter values, suggesting that the perturbative treatment
is more robust under strong biophysical coupling than might
be expected. We leave elucidation of the reasons for this
unexpected robustness to future work.
2A familiar example of phases comes from thermodynamics, in
which substances such as water show the phases, solid, liquid and
gas across different ranges of temperature and pressure.
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Fig. S2. Comparison of biophysical and social dynamics of subsystem 1, in the presence of purely biophysical subsystem coupling,
between full numerical solution and perturbative approximation of the biophysical dynamics. Cases of very weak (left), weak (middle)
and strong (right) coupling are shown. a: zeroth-order resource dynamics, ρ(1)0 (τ); b: first-order resource perturbation dynamics, ρ
(1)
1 (τ); c:
comparison of perturbative approximation
(
ρ(1)(τ) ≈ ρ(1)0 (τ) + δρ(1)1 (τ), purple
)
with full numerical resource dynamics (orange); d: comparison
of cooperative population fraction dynamics between full numerical solution (blue) and solution using perturbative approximation for the
biophysical dynamics (red). Parameters and initial conditions shown at top.
C. Supplementary results
Here we present detailed results to explain the deviations
in the subsystem 1 fixed points under different cases of
coupling (main text fig’s 3, 4a), compared with an isolated
subsystem (main text fig. S1). Evaluating (main text eq’n
10b) determines the shifts in biophysical equilibria across the
parameter space (See fig. S3). As (main text eq’n 10a) makes
clear, ρ(1)1
∗
varies proportionally to the difference in zeroth-
order resource equilibria; when ρ(1)0
∗
is higher than ρ(2)0
∗
, the
first-order dynamics transfer resource from subsystem 1 to 2,
and conversely.
Figure S4 plots the ostracism (ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
)) and payoff
(pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
)) experienced by subsystem 1 defec-
tors when coupling is purely biophysical. The payoff differs
between the uncollaborative and collaborative scenarios, and
is shown for both. Curve intersections correspond to mixed
social fixed points because φ˙(1)(τ) = 0 when ω(1)(τ) = pid(1)(τ)
in (9); the ostracism and payoff experienced by defectors
balance under this condition. When defectors harvest with
effort only modestly higher than cooperators (e.g. 25% higher:
µ(1) = 0.25(µN − 1) + 1 = 1.63; panels c and d) there is only
one mixed fixed point (unstable) and it is not significantly
affected by either subsystem 2 cooperativity (φ(2)
∗
= 0, 1) or
norm scenario. However, when defectors harvest with effort
close to the Nash level (e.g. µ(1) = 0.9(µN − 1) + 1 = 3.25), both
of these quantities strongly affect subsystem 1 behaviour.
There are two mixed fixed points in the collaborative scenario
under both subsystem 2 cooperativity conditions, and also
in the uncollaborative scenario when subsystem 2 is purely
defective (φ(2)
∗
= 0). However, when φ(2)
∗
= 1 (panel b),
subsystem 1 has no mixed fixed points because the defector
payoff, pi(1)d , is higher than the ostracism, ω
(1), for all values
of φ(1). Intuitively, this is because biophysical coupling pro-
vides subsystem 1 agents access to additional resource from
subsystem 2, which increases the defector payoff, while in the
absence of social coupling, subsystem 2 cannot provide any
extra ostracism to balance this increased payoff for subsystem
1 defectors.
Figure S5 plots ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
) and pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
)
in the case of purely social coupling. When subsystem 2
equilibrates at φ(2)
∗
= 0 (panels a, c), the ostracism felt by
defectors in subsystem 1 is significant only when φ(1)
∗
reaches
the threshold (∼ 0.35) determined by the parameterisation of
(8) (see fig. S1). Subsystem 1 behaviour then shows no phase
transition in stability landscape relative to the isolated case;
when defectors harvest only modestly harder than coopera-
tors (e.g. µ(1) = 1.63) there is a single mixed (unstable) fixed
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Fig. S3. Fixed points of the first-order biophysical dynamics in
subsystem 1 (ρ(1)1
∗
), in the uncollaborative and collaborative norm
scenarios. Per (main text eq’n 3), when multiplied by δ these give the
biophysical coupling-induced shifts in the subsystem 1 fixed points
compared with an isolated subsystem (see main text fig. S1). Results
are shown for cases in which subsystem 2 equilibrates at each of its
two monomorphic social fixed points. Values in panels a and b are
negative because in those cases the equilibria correspond to ongoing
transfer of resource from subsystem 1 to 2. The reverse is true for
panels c and d.
point (panel c), and when defectors harvest at close to the
Nash effort (µ(1) = 3.25), a second mixed (stable) fixed point
occurs (panel a). However, when subsystem 2 equilibrates
at its purely cooperative fixed point (φ(2)
∗
= 1; panels b,
d), subsystem 1 defectors experience nonzero ostracism even
when the cooperative population fraction in subsystem 1
is below its threshold (∼ 0.35), due to the influence of
subsystem 2 cooperators mediated by the social coupling. In
this case, when µ(1) = 3.25, only a single mixed (stable) social
fixed point is observed, with a large cooperator majority
(panel b). When µ(1) = 1.63, however, two mixed social fixed
points are present (one stable, one unstable), including one
(stable) not seen in the case of purely biophysical coupling,
with a large defector majority (panel d).
Figure S6 plots ω(1)(φ(1)
∗
, φ(2)
∗
) and pi(1)d (ec , µ
(1), φ(1)
∗
, ρ(1)
∗
),
showing their intersections, when biophysical and social
couplings are both moderate (δ = λ = 0.5). The results can
largely be understood as a straightforward combination of
the effects seen above, in figures S4 and S5. Of particular
note, however, is the prevention of collapse of cooperation,
in the uncollaborative scenario, previously seen for purely
biophysical coupling (fig. S4b), here replaced by a single
highly cooperative equilibrium (S6b). This occurs because
the added ostracism due to social coupling overwhelms the
added defector payoff due to extra resource availability from
biophysical coupling. The same explanation underlies the
replacement of the bistable behaviour previously seen in the
collaborative scenario, under the same parameters, (fig. S4b)
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Fig. S4. Determination of mixed social fixed points in subsystem
1 in the case of purely biophysical subsystem coupling, in the
uncollaborative and collaborative norm scenarios. Fixed points are
determined by intersections between the defector payoff (blue, pur-
ple) and ostracism (orange). Results shown for both monomorphic
social equilibria in subsystem 2. In the uncollaborative scenario in b,
there is no intersection, resulting in the collapse of cooperation.
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Fig. S5. Determination of mixed social fixed points in subsystem
1 in the case of purely social subsystem coupling, in the uncol-
laborative and collaborative norm scenarios (which are identical
in this case). Results shown for both monomorphic social equilibria
in subsystem 2. Ostracism is nonzero even for small φ(1) in panels b
and d because φ(2)
∗
= 1 and the social coupling conveys ostracism to
subsystem 1 even when its own population is largely or completely
defective. This enables the appearance of a fixed point in d, not seen
in the absence of social coupling. This is a stable, mixed fixed point
with a large defector majority.
also by a single highly cooperative equilibrium (fig. S6b).
D. Mechanisms underlying stability phases
Figure 4b presents social stability phase plots for subsystem
1, showing up to five different phases across the weak cou-
pling parameter space. In this section, we briefly summarise
mechanisms underlying the behaviour of each phase. In the
purely defective D region, additional ostracism due to very
weak social coupling is inadequate to balance the extra defec-
tor payoff due to added resource availability from moderate
biophysical coupling. Defector payoff exceeds ostracism for
all subsystem 1 population compositions, making collapse of
cooperation inevitable. With a very small increase in social
coupling we shift to the DC¯ phase. Here, added ostracism
from subsystem 2 enables the ostracism experienced by sub-
system 1 defectors to balance the defector payoff but only
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Fig. S6. Determination of mixed social fixed points in subsystem 1
in the case of combined biophysical and social subsystem coupling,
in the uncollaborative and collaborative norm scenarios. Results
shown for both monomorphic social equilibria in subsystem 2. The
norm scenarios differ only through small shifts in the fixed points
and have no qualitative differences in the cases shown.
when ostracism from subsystem 1 is also high, which occurs
only with a cooperative majority. This phase includes the
isolated subsystem case (δ = λ = 0) and region of what
may be considered very weak couplings (δ . 0.1, λ . 0.1).
Increasing social coupling again, we shift to the D¯C¯ phase,
in which added ostracism from subsystem 2 is sufficient to
balance the defector payoff even when subsystem 1 has a de-
fector majority, giving rise to the mixed, defector-dominated
attractor. The mixed, cooperator-dominated attractor persists
in this phase because the ostracism and defector payoff can
also balance when subsystem 1 has a cooperator majority (see
e.g. fig. S6a, b). With yet higher social coupling, we enter
the D¯C phase. Here, ostracism and defector payoff balance
only when both are low because subsystem 1 is dominated
by defectors. When it is instead dominated by cooperators,
ostracism exceeds defector payoff due to the moderate social
coupling. Finally, near the upper bound of the weak social
coupling range, we reach the purely cooperative C phase.
Here, ostracism exceeds defector payoff for all subsystem 1
population compositions, necessitating collapse of defection.
The overall trend is that increasing the social coupling, even
within its weak range, causes successive phase transitions in
the subsystem 1 stability landscape, gradually increasing its
cooperativity.
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Fig. S7. Shifted biophysical (blue, purple) and social (orange)
fixed points in subsystem 1 under purely biophysical subsystem
coupling (panels a,b) and mixed social and biophysical coupling
(c,d) when subsystem 2 equilibrates at its purely defective fixed
point (φ(2)
∗
= 0). Results shown for uncollaborative (a,c) and collabo-
rative (b,d) norm scenarios and moderate coupling (δ = 0.5, λ = 0.5).
Dashed and solid orange loci respectively comprise unstable and
stable social fixed points. The results show only small deviations and
no stability phase transitions compared with an isolated subsystem
(fig. S1). The effect of subsystem 2 long-time behaviour (φ(2)
∗
= 0 vs.
φ(2)
∗
= 1) on subsystem 1 long-time behaviour under these couplings
can be seen by comparing panels a,b of this figure with a-i and a-ii
in figure 3, and panels c,d here with a-i and a-ii in figure 4
S4
